Poland says it cannot simply copy Ukraine's frontline experience fighting russian drones, and when you look closer at the constraints, that position makes sense. In an interview with Defence24, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General Stanisław Chosnek, explained that legal, operational and societal limits in peacetime force Warsaw to consider different tactics and tools than those used by Ukrainian forces under martial law.
The core problem is legal and political: Poland operates under peacetime rules of engagement, with stronger restrictions on kinetic measures that carry risk to civilians and infrastructure. Stanisław Chosnek cited a concrete example, the night of 9-10 September when the AIM-120 missile launched from a fighter accidentally fell on a residential building, to underline the dangers of freer use of kinetic interceptors in populated areas. That risk calculus pushes Poland toward solutions with smaller collateral effects.
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As a result, Warsaw is prioritizing non-kinetic countermeasures, electronic warfare, jamming and other soft-kill options, rather than replicating Ukraine's heavy use of kinetic interceptors. These systems reduce the chance of unintended damage but face their own limitations: many long-range russian drones are built to resist EW and other interference, so countering them remains technically challenging.
Poland is already working with domestic industry on tailored counter-UAV tools. The SKYCtrl suppression system and the FIELDCtrl detection suite from Advanced Protection Systems are explicitly mentioned by Stanisław Chosnek; he said the military does not yet exploit their full potential and improvements are underway. Fielded and battle-tested solutions adapted to Poland's peacetime constraints would be a major step forward.
That said, Warsaw is not abandoning kinetic air defence altogether. Polish planners are running a three-track modernization effort: Wisła for medium-range systems (including Patriot localisation), Narew for short-range, and SAN for very short-range (VSHORAD). The SAN layer includes systems such as Pilica and Poprad, as well as the proven Piorun MANPADS – all intended to form a layered defence that can be escalated if the security situation deteriorates.
Poland is also transferring Ukrainian lessons on loitering and small UAVs into its own projects: integration of counter-drone drones into air defense networks and close cooperation with Ukrainian specialists are ongoing. At the same time, Warsaw follows technological trends, there is active interest in directed-energy weapons (lasers) and high-power microwave systems, but officials acknowledge these technologies remain immature and limited by practical shortcomings.
Finally, Poland intends to expand counter-drone protection across the whole country, not just along the eastern border, using financing instruments such as the SAFE loan programme alongside a broader procurement list. The bottom line: Polish defense planners are actively absorbing Ukrainian experience, but legal, political and technical realities mean Ukraine's approach can only be adapted, not copied wholesale. The effectiveness of Poland's tailored mix of EW, layered kinetic systems and emerging technologies will be proven only over time.
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