Tensions and the threat of russian invasion of the Baltic states are steadily increasing. Therefore, the question of how to slow the russian advance to give allied forces time to intervene is becoming increasingly urgent.
In a Breaking Defense article, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Carvelli proposed measures to complicate the road network in the Baltic states. He proposes redesigning key sections of roads to create serpentine traffic patterns, converting conventional bridges into drawbridges, creating roundabouts with obstacles in the center, and installing remotely controlled systems for blocking roads.
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This would slow russian troops, theoretically giving allied forces valuable time. Carvelli's assessment was based on the way russians moved and advanced in Ukraine at the start of the full-scale invasion
At that time, russian forces were advancing rapidly in large columns along the main highways. They were stopped thanks to the powerful resistance of the Defense Forces of Ukraine and the blocking of these highways.

If key transport hubs in the Baltic states are designed to be quickly blocked, russian forces would be forced to advance along slow rural roads or across fields.
However, this solution has its drawbacks. These barriers must be designed carefully, because poorly planned measures could have the opposite effect. russian sabotage groups can use them to slow down NATO forces, which will help russia in its offensive.

It is also important to take into account the geography and small size of the Baltic states. Even with all main roads blocked, forcing russians onto country roads and across fields, they would require only a few more hours to cut off the Suwałki Gap, as the distance between Belarus and Kaliningrad is only 65 km.
This scenario presumes there are no defensive fortifications or substantial resistance. In planning defenses, it is crucial not to depend only on allied forces and slowing russian advances on highways, but to incorporate fortifications and mining as well.

Lithuania has clearly taken this into account, and is now designing a 50 km-deep line of defense. However, even if Russian advances on the highways are delayed, the time gained would still not suffice for NATO forces to mobilize, as Europe faces serious issues with troop mobility. These problems are evident in almost all areas of transportation.
As for air transport, the Bundeswehr, for example, requires two A400M aircraft and at least four days to move a single PUMA IFV. The same applies to transport by rail and road, where numerous logistical choke points exist across Europe, and €17 billion has already been allocated to address the issue.

Therefore, it would take days, not just hours, for European forces to fully deploy in the region. If the forces are not already stationed in the region, these hours would allow them to take up positions and prepare for combat operations.
Therefore, the idea of redesigning key road infrastructure locations is a good one that should be implemented to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Baltic countries. However, the design must be handled with caution and responsibility. These assets need to be protected to avoid backfiring and cannot be relied on alone. They are effective only when combined with fortifications and military resistance.
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