Is quite expected and logical that russia will try to go on the offensive before Ukraine receives additional reinforcements with Western aid.
The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has already reported that the Kremlin is preparing for an offensive with the aim trying to capture the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end March. Intelligence has already recorded the relocation of additional assault groups, units, weapons and military equipment precisely in the eastern direction.
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At the same time, there is no opportunity for the russian federation to implement a large-scale offensive from Belarus. According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, such a scenario is excluded in the coming weeks, since the formation of strike groups has not been recorded. This representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Andrii Chernyak reported that during an interview with the Kyiv Post.
Also, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Oleksii Reznikov, noted that the actual size of the "partial mobilization" in russia is half a million people. He also noted that the Kremlin can launch an offensive in the south. He announced this to the French BFMTV channel.
Overall, russia’s intention is quite clear: an attempt to consolidate a strategic initiative that was in the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the second half of 2022. Globally, this means that it is the Kremlin that wants to impose the time and place of the battle, forcing Ukraine to go on the defensive and thwart attempts to liberate the occupied territories.
But if the situation at the global level looks exactly like this, then the implementation of russia’s plan currently contains several important aspects.
First, it is time itself. February or even March are quite difficult time limits for active offensive actions. The terrain remains difficult to pass, daylight is still short, and weather conditions do not always allow the use of aviation for direct fire support.
Secondly, it is the level of equipment of the mobilized. Arming such a large number of personnel in a relatively short period is an impossible task to complete. Defense Express has already provided demonstration calculations regarding the required amount of weapons to form 200,000 mobilized.
In the case of 500,000, we should be talking about absolutely insane numbers of more than 7,000 tanks, 23,000 combat vehicles of the IFV/APC type and more than 8,000 artillery systems of all kinds. These calculations are purely illustrative from the perspective of equipping precisely motorized rifle units, since it is unlikely that russia needs to increase the number of personnel in the navy or aviation.
But, as already mentioned, the lack of heavy weapons is absolutely not a deterrent for the Kremlin. Even the lack of automobile vehicles is not something critical, because in order to simply put 500 thousand conscripts on trucks, which also have to deliver ammunition and food, russians need to find more than 174 thousand units of motor vehicles. These figures may seem exaggerated, but half a million personnel is almost twice as much as the total number of all russia’s ground forces as of 2021.
But, taking everything into account, the presence of 500,000 mobilised, some of them have already been involved in hostilities, does not mean that all half a million will be used at the same time during the offensive. But this means that the reserves for offensive manpower in russia are really more than significant.
Also, taking into account the aspect of the time period and the related weather conditions, as well as look at the latest offensive actions of the russian federation in the area of Bakhmut and Vuhledar, it is possible to make a cautious assumption about a possible attempted offensive.
Namely, massive infantry assaults with minimal use of armored vehicles. And only in certain areas, with a possible outlined success, reinforced with heavy armored vehicles and concentration of artillery means on them. In fact, this is a repetition of the Soviet offensives of the 1942 model using similar methods.
This tactic is quite realistic for russia in view of the complete insensitivity to losses.
Finally, Defense Express notes that the Kremlin's use of such a method of conducting hostilities is quite risky for russia’s army itself, since the failure of such an offensive means a significant decrease in overall combat capability and the risk of missing successful counterattack of Ukraine’s military. And most likely, russia’s General Staff realizes this very well and prepared for such a scenario, having created quite powerful fortifications in the rear in a short time.
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