Given the latest public statements, the russian federation is clearly looking for an excuse to legitimize its invasion of the so-called "Transnistria" or even Moldova in general. For example, the russian foreign affairs ministry and defense ministry the other day accused Ukraine of allegedly preparing an invasion of the unrecognized "Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic".
In turn, the Prime Minister of Moldova, Dorin Recean, replied that he was aware of "several destabilization scenarios" at once, one of them involves a landing operation by the russian armed forces in Chisinau, in an attempt to seize the local airport and establish an airbridge.
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We can see the level of threat also due to the statement by the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, he said his country was ready to support Moldova, whatever scenario of events unfolds, and the character of this support would depend on the specific situation. Therefore, it makes sense to once again raise the question of what kind of force the russian federation has in "Transnistria" how many russian troops are there and what they are capable of in general.
According to The Military Balance 2022, there are 1,500 personnel of the russian regular army, a few Mi-8 transport and seven Mi-24 attack helicopters. Also, open sources tell us there are up to 100 armored vehicles, which amounts to two battalion-tactical groups (roughly, battalions). Beside that, the "Transnistrian forces" also have about 8,000 troops, up to 40 T-64 and T-72 tanks, about 40 various armored fighting vehicles and 40 self-propelled guns.
On paper, it looks quite convincing, although this much force might be not enough to gain a decisive superiority over the Armed Forces of Moldova, despite the latter sometimes listed as "the weakest army in Eastern Europe".
Going back to The Military Balance 2022, the Armed Forces of Moldova include 5,150 active military personnel and up to 58,000 reservists. The Land Forces comprise 4 light infantry brigades and 1 special operations brigade having almost 200 light armored vehicles, 250 artillery systems both towed and self-propelled combined, 28 ZU-23-2 air defense guns and 11 S-60 AA guns.
When it comes to the possibility of russian aggression from "Transnistria", it always comes to one factor – the big ammunition depot near Cobasna.
But in order to fully engage the russian forces in the"PMR", they need much more resources: spare parts and fuel to keep vehicles going, rations for the personnel etc.
And finally, we cannot rule out the possibility of mobilization in "Transnistria", as the russian usual practice goes. This will only add to the needs of the local army.
Quite possibly, there is no such resource basis in the unrecognized "PMR" in reality, and the Kremlin realizes how futile are the dreams of a "casual walk to Chisinau" by the russians in "Transnistria" with the force available at hand.
That is why Moscow is attempting the following algorithm: first, destabilization in Moldova in order to turn into one of the Kremlin's satellites, then use its territory as a potential platform to open a "second front" against Ukraine.
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