oscow's constant threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine elevate the importance of anti-missile air defense systems, created specifically to counter this kind of threat. And when it comes to addressing the threat from the russian federation, the first and foremost echelon of anti-missile defense to come to mind is the Aegis Ashore system deployed in Europe since 2016
The facilities of this system are unfolded in two locations: one in Deveselu, Romania fully operational since 2016, and another one in Redzikowo, Poland which is yet to be fully integrated after a "planned maintenance period," according to the latest official data from December 2023. The Polish component of the system is expected to become online by summer 2024, already with the newest Standard Missile - 3 (SM-3) interceptor.
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The targets this system is supposed to intercept are intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Aegis Ashore is basically the land-based iteration of the naval Aegis system installed onto Arleigh Burke destroyers.
These ships can be found in Europe, too, but they are on duty in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Atlantic. Being too far from russia, they are irrelevant to our topic being how this system can prevent a russian nuclear attack, particularly on Ukraine if push comes to shove.
Therefore, let's focus on the two land-situated systems and their capabilities. Although the Polish deployment site is located 500 km from the border with Ukraine and 1,000 km from Kyiv, and the Romanian one is 380 km and 850 km afar, respectively, the answer will be: yes, intercepting nukes approaching Ukraine is within the known specifications.
These specifications were disclosed in a presentation by Patrick J. O’Reilly, then-director of the Missile Defense Agency, for the AUSA conference in 2011:
The infographic expected that by 2020, Aegis Ashore would not only cover the entirety of Ukraine but extend further into the russian territory, even surpassing the declared range of the SM-3 missile of 1,200 km. And although it seems to be the end of the discussion, in fact, there's more to it.
Crucially, that data applies to instances of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). During the flight, ICBMs ascend into space to an altitude of over 1,000 km, that is, many times higher than the ISS orbit. The specific missiles in question are russian Topol, its modernization Yars, R-36M-2 Voevoda, modernized Sarmat, and others.
If any of those, even one missile, is launched then, first of all, it will be almost immediately noticed because this is exactly what the over-the-horizon radars and a network of satellites — a critically important element of nuclear deterrence — deal with. Secondly, NATO will try to shoot down the missile as quickly as possible. The reason for the hurry is simple: the longer intercontinental ballistic missiles fly, the more difficult it becomes to intercept them because after the third stage of ascent is completed, the weapon begins the process of separating warheads and releasing decoys.
That is why Aegis Ashore actually does not create an "umbrella" of protection over Ukraine but rather reaches out to launch sites of russian intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 7th, 14th, 28th, and 54th rocket divisions armed with Yars ICBM. That is so that NATO can neutralize any intercontinental missile launched from russia as quickly as possible.
This aspect, most likely, determines the maximum level of Aegis Ashore system's automation that works with minimal involvement on the part of personnel, because human reaction is insufficient when it comes to anti-missile defense.
Still, the russian federation, besides ICBMs, also has tactical nuclear weapons integrated with the Iskander short-range ballistic missile system. At short range, the SM-3 will be helpless. However, the responsibility of intercepting such threats in the U.S. and numerous NATO nations has been given to the Patriot PAC3.
Read more: russia’s Purported Criteria for the Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
