Earlier Defense Express pointed out how russians suddenly discovered that the repairability of their tanks is 3–5 times below expected, reading through the pages of the recently published Material and Technical Support magazine, issue No. 10 for October 2024. There's actually more to take note of.
For instance, in the same journal, we can also find interesting assessments in general regarding the protection of light armored vehicles in the russian army, and particularly how it shows in the battles against Ukraine. These conclusions practically answer why the russian attackers do not use their BTR-70s for assaults and prefer BTR-80s and BTR-82s for this role — despite suffering from a shortage of armored vehicles on the frontline.
Read more: Repairability of Tanks Turned Out 3 to 5 Times Below Expected, russians Suddenly Discover
Turns out, the russian troops are not satisfied with the level of protection and ergonomics of the BTR-70. The article states that "the BTR-70 has shown its complete unsuitability for use in combat operations," so instead they opt for BTR-80 and BTR-82 to support assault operations. All because those vehicles are more convenient and safe, and equipped with powerful diesel engines.
For a quick reference, according to The Military Balance 2024 study by IISS, the russian army had almost 3,000 armored personnel carriers in service:
- 700 BTR-82A/AM, 1200 BTR-80, and 100 BTR-80A (for some reason classified as infantry fighting vehicles),
- 800 BTR-60 of all variants,
- and only 200 BTR-70;
- plus 1,300 BTR-60 and BTR-70 vehicles were kept in storage at the beginning of this year.
There's also qualitative data on the nature of combat damage inflicted to BMP-1, BMP-2, and BMP-3 IFVs during the battles against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Most common places where damage was caused by hits from anti-tank grenade launchers and from direct or fragmentation hits from mines are the hull, the engine unit, and the passenger compartment. When hit by an RPG-7 grenade, the armor was pierced through, or the turret got displaced due to the breakdown of the turret ring (observed in the BMP-2), or hatches and doors got jammed (observed in the BMP-3).
If a landmine detonated close enough, its fragments pierced the armor and fuel tanks, located beside the doors of the passenger compartment. Then, the IFV caught fire, with subsequent ammunition payload cookoff, and its characteristic feature — the turret getting flown away 5–7 meters from the vehicle body.
The general conclusion the russian authors draw is that "during the identification of the causes of ammunition explosions in tanks and IFVs, a number of design flaws were found in the layout of the crew compartment, in the placement of ammunition and fuel in unarmored compartments, and in the use of fire extinguishing systems with thermal sensors which don't provide reliable extinguishing of fires in the engine and crew compartments."
Simply put, the russians admitted the problems are fundamental, and in order to eliminate them, a complete revision of the whole internal layout must be done.
Though worth noting that, further down the text, they provide an example of an interesting proposal: to install automated smoke screen systems on tanks and armored vehicles either to facilitate safe evacuation of crews from damaged equipment, or to simulate damage. Such a know-how may eventually find their way to the Ukrainian battlefield.
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