A prominent russian military blogger (milblogger) stated on January 23 that russian forces need to figure out how to break out of positional warfare, but that russian forces are unable to concentrate in numbers sufficient to break through Ukrainian lines because Ukrainian forces strike all force concentrations larger than a battalion, the ISW said.
He complained that Ukrainian troops were striking russian forces even in the near rear areas.
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The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces still target small russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies and of 10 armored vehicles with drone strikes, preventing russian forces from even reaching Ukrainian forward defensive lines.
The milblogger noted that russian forces’ only solution thus far has been to attack with 10-20 dismounted infantrymen with armored vehicles supporting at an "extreme" distance behind the infantry.
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger responded in agreement with the first milblogger, claiming that Ukrainian technological advancements have made it difficult for russian forces to concentrate several divisions in a discrete geographic area without Ukrainian forces detecting the force concentration.
He emphasized that russian forces need to both obtain indirect fire superiority over Ukrainian forces and overhaul russian command-and-control (C2) to break out of positional warfare. The milblogger stressed that russian forces on the frontline need to be able to quickly communicate to minimize the time between spotting and striking a target, and that this change will only occur with a significant change in C2 processes.
ISW analysts noted that the characteristics and problems of positional warfare that russian milbloggers have identified in recent discussions overlap with many systemic issues in the russian military that the milbloggers have been complaining about for a long time. russian milbloggers have complained generally about poor russian C2 as it pertains to indirect fire, the attrition of russian forces through unproductive “meat assaults” against Ukrainian positions, poor tactical and operational planning, and the struggle to counter Ukrainian drone operations on the front line and in near rear areas.
There are currently no indications that the russian military command has materially improved on any of these identified issues at the operational level necessary to break through a positional front in one or more areas of the theater.
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