Ukrainians ambush russian convoys, enemy’s tanks get broken-down. Generals killed close to the front on Ukrainian land. Long-expired rations. Frostbite.
Russia’s military was built for quick, overwhelming firepower, experts say, but its weakness is logistics. And on the roads of Ukraine a month after the first invasion, that weakness is clearly showing
Many analysts say the Russians assumed they would quickly capture the capital city of Kyiv and force President Volodymyr Zelensky out of power. Whatever the strategy, that outcome did not happen, and Russia has been complicated by an inability to keep supplies flowing to troops in a longer ground war.
After weeks of little success except in southeastern Ukraine, despite continuous shelling and thousands of military and civilian casualties, Moscow said during peace negotiations on Tuesday that it would “drastically reduce” military activity in the northern part of the country, near Kyiv and Chernihiv.
After a surprisingly fierce Ukrainian resistance, “we can suspect that [Russians] did not properly organize the logistics necessary for an effective Plan B, which was to have an actual, serious fight in what is the largest country in Europe outside of Russia,” said Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a Virginia-based think tank.
Ukraine’s sheer size is a problem.
Russia prefers to move troops and supplies on railroads, and it is doing that now in the southeast after seizing Kherson and Melitopol and securing a crossing over the Dnipro River.
But it doesn’t control rail hubs such as Chernihiv in the north, and because the ground has been wet and muddy, Russian vehicles have to stick to roads.
“Trucking takes a lot of time,” said Kofman, “and the tyranny of distance becomes really, really challenging because they're trying to push a large force down some fairly narrow roads.”
And it’s not just one trip. Supply trucks and other support vehicles have to constantly shuttle back and forth.
What one Russian formation may look like
Weapons and fighters in any ground invasion would not last long without the support of mechanics, medics, engineers, truck drivers, cooks and other crew. That’s because the needs of soldiers fighting a modern war are enormous. On average, each Russian soldier goes through about 440 pounds of supplies a day, including food, fuel, ammunition, medical support, etc.
Russia has sent more than 150,000 troops into Ukraine, organized into various formations.
The Russian army operates with fewer support soldiers than other militaries. About 150 of the 700 to 900 troops could be considered support, and because this formation would be an arm of a larger force in the area, they could also expect help from other logistics units.
But the ratio would still not come close to that of the U.S. Army, which deploys about 10 support soldiers for every combat soldier, retired Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin said.
Defense Express reminds that whatever the russian formation may look like, the enemy ends up being destroyed.
Problems and possible problems
If Russia’s invasion plan had called for slow, steady advances, Vershinin said, it would have tried to quickly control the airspace and then set up secure mini-bases every 30 to 40 miles as it captured territory. Each base would have a repair depot, medical station and stockpiles so that supplies were never far away.
But Russia instead tried to dominate in long, fast, first pushes, which stretched its supply line much further. For instance, Russia’s early push from Crimea to Kherson was about 120 miles, and the push from Belarus to Kyiv was 86. The maximum workable distance from a railhead is considered to be 90 to 120 miles.
Vershinin said he suspects that the infamous 40-mile convoy was not “stalled” outside Kyiv, but was intentionally stopped and that pieces were repositioned to act as a logistics base that would be out of range of Ukrainian artillery in case Russia tries to capture the city later.
Defense Express also reminds about successful destruction of this infamous 40-mile russian column by Ukrainian drone operators.
The choice to go light on logistics may work in a quick military action but doesn’t leave much room for error in a longer one. Here are some problems the Russians appear to be having:
Inadequate protection of supply convoys
Trucks moving along supply lines need protection, especially if travel options have been narrowed to a few predictable roads.
But early on, Kofman said, Russian troops didn’t execute the basics of convoy escort, which involves armored vehicles and soldiers traveling with and defending vulnerable logistics vehicles. Supply vehicles were sometimes left on their own, even after the Ukrainian military advised citizens on social media to attack unarmored fuel trucks.