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​Why russia Uses Fewer Glide Bombs in Ukraine and Why It's Too Early to Jump to Conclusions

A russian FAB bomb equipped with an UMPK glide and guidance kit / Open-source illustrative photo
A russian FAB bomb equipped with an UMPK glide and guidance kit / Open-source illustrative photo
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Last week felt like russian forces decreased their guided glide bomb attacks on Ukraine but official statistics tell otherwise

Lately, reports in the media suggested that russian armed forces have decreased the use of so-called KABs, or guided aerial bombs. Among these, the most common are glide bombs equipped with UMPK, a russian analog of the American JDAM guidance kit. The reports say the frequency of such attacks has almost halved as of late, offering various explanations for this trend.

In contrast, official statistics tell otherwise. According to the data stated in the December 15 address by Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, russians spent approximately 630 KABs over the past week (December 9–15).

Read more: ​russia Wants to Increase KABs Range to 150 km by Installing Rocket Boosters

While the figures for the week prior (Dec. 2–8) were not announced, we can still compare the statistics to the last week of November (25.11 – 01.12): the russians launched about 500 KABs during the period. In other words, the number of KAB strikes actually increased.

Though if we look further into the past, indeed, the rest of November is marked by a weekly expenditure of 800 to 900 KABs by russian forces. The peak was between October 21 and 27 with 1,100 guided bombs launched on Ukraine, as reported. The figures steadily decline as we approach the summer period, with 750 KABs deployed on August 12–19; 700 bombs on July 8–14; 600 in the first week of July, and 800 in the last week of June.

Even though the official statistics on russia's use of guided bombs are not complete and systematic, we can notice that a weekly consumption of about 600 KABs is quite ordinary. If the number of strikes has dropped at some point, it would be compared to that spike in October.

One reason for this assumed in the media is the permission to use U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems for strikes on russian territory, as it forced russian close-radius aviation to hide deeper in the rear. The premise is that the public ban lifting on November 17 coincides with the moment when the frequency of russian bomb strikes takes a sharp dive.

A russian Su-34 carrying UMPK glide bombs / Defense Express / Why russia Uses Fewer Glide Bombs in Ukraine and Why It's Too Early to Jump to Conclusions
A russian Su-34 carrying UMPK glide bombs / Open-source illustrative photo

Another factor affecting the dynamic could have been the weather, although the adverse weather conditions affected not the tactical aircraft carrying the bombs but degraded the effectiveness of russian reconnaissance UAVs. After all, the use of KABs requires real-time information about target coordinates, and it is drones that are largely responsible for seeking out potential targets. The amount of reconnaissance data has also been whittled down thanks to the Ukrainian anti-aircraft drones, which have destroyed hundreds of russian reconnaissance UAVs since August 2024.

Then an explanation is in order as to why the summer data includes weeks when russians launched a relatively modest 600 KABs. In this case, the fault was definitely not the summer weather or the loss of reconnaissance drones — if anything, it was the time when using Yak-52 sport aircraft was considered the best idea to counter them.

The same goes for the popular theory that russian Su-34 tactical bombers were nearing the limits of equipment tear and wear. It is unlikely to be any relevant here because russians even manage to produce new Su-34s and Su-35s, as they report, so there is unlikely to be serious problems with the maintenance of the operational ones.

Assembly of UMPK kits in russia. Photos published in August 2024 / Defense Express / Why russia Uses Fewer Glide Bombs in Ukraine and Why It's Too Early to Jump to Conclusions
Assembly of UMPK kits in russia. Photos published in August 2024 / Screenshot of a russian MoD video

The production capacity of the UMPK kits is often mentioned but we've already seen the scale at which they are manufactured thanks to simplistic, almost primitive designs geared towards mass production.

As for what are the underlying reasons explaining whose ups and downs, Defense Express won't dive into conjectures but notes the main point drawn from the available statistical data: the proper assessment of trends can only be complete when figures dynamic over time are taken into account. There might also be no single factor that explains it all but a combination of multiple ones coinciding in time.

Read more: UMPK Dismantled and Analyzed: What's Inside the russian Kit Turning Dumb FAB Into a Guided Bomb (Video)