Not to be confused with the Crimean city of Simferopol, the namesake ship of the Ukrainian Navy was attacked on August 28. The fact was initially reported by russian sources and has been acknowledged by the Ukrainian military command. The said ship was damaged, and one crew member was killed; the vessel is being repaired.
The russian defense ministry disagreed, stating that the Simferopol ship was "destroyed," and revealed that the strike was inflicted by a naval drone — an important detail worth a closer analysis.
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The first potential weapon of attack that comes to mind is the Katran — an unmanned surface vessel (USV) russia copied from Ukraine: not only its concept but even the name.
Although Katrans were not originally designed as kamikaze drones, they could have been modified to carry warheads. However, they have a major problem that lies in their guidance: Katrans use a radio channel, while Ukrainian sea drones rely on satellite communications. This limits the russian USV's range to about 150–200 km and makes it vulnerable to electronic warfare.
The strike on the Simferopol ship took place at the mouth of the Danube River, around 200 km from the nearest russian-controlled shore. This raises questions about how the attack was carried out.
One possibility is launch and control from offshore gas platforms still held by the occupiers. Another is that control signals were relayed through an Orion UAV flying nearby, which could have acted as a repeater.
Attempts at introducing satellite communication in russian naval drones have yielded poor results. Earlier in 2025, russia showcased a new satellite antenna and mounted it on the Briz USV — initially planned as a civilian project. Instead of a breakthrough, however, the system looked more like a throwback to the 1990s, with questionable combat effectiveness.
Yet, the quality of video recorded from the attacking drone suggests use of so-called "gray" Starlink terminals smuggled into russia. Such equipment has already been seen, for example, on the Murena-300S naval drone presented at the Armiya-2024 exhibition.
That model was advertised with a 500 km range, speeds up to 45 knots, and a 500-kg warhead. After the show, it was again spotted — this time armed with light torpedoes.
Given that Simferopol is not a large vessel — 55 meters long, 10 wide, and built on a fishing trawler design — even a relatively small warhead would be sufficient to cause serious damage.
Another possible culprit is a yet-unnamed drone shown during the July Storm exercises in July 2025. Its use in training increases the likelihood that it could have been deployed operationally as well.
Looking further back, russian naval drone attacks were hinted at as early as 2023, when a video surfaced of an uncrewed boat striking on the Dniester Estuary bridge. While never officially confirmed, if genuine, that would mark the first russian sea drone attack.
Now, russia has openly expanded its work in this area. Around a dozen different naval drone models have already been displayed. Most are still controlled either by radio channels, by smuggled Starlink units, or by weak domestic equivalents.
Defending against such drones requires layered protection. The most effective methods near ports and river mouths are boom barriers, strong electronic warfare coverage, and air defense against reconnaissance UAVs that guide drones to targets.
Ukraine could also deploy longer-range kinetic countermeasures on the coast, such as its own counter-drones armed with machine guns or FPV drones and hunt the threats down from anywhere in the Black Sea. This, though, would require solving the more complex task of detection across wide areas.
Either way, Ukraine is now facing a new and evolving threat that demands rapid countermeasures.
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