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Kontakt-1 and Grilles on Leopard Tanks in Ukrainian Service Confuse the Germans—But They Offer No Better Alternative

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Leopard 2A4 with the name "Lakhmatyi" of the 33rd Mechanized Brigade / Photo credit: Ruslan Tarasov/ArmyInform
Leopard 2A4 with the name "Lakhmatyi" of the 33rd Mechanized Brigade / Photo credit: Ruslan Tarasov/ArmyInform

Or how the conceptual crisis of tank protection measures appears on the modern battlefield

German analysts are actively discussing reports on the use of improvised protection measures—such as grilles and Kontakt-1 reactive armor blocks—on Leopard 2 and Leopard 1 tanks in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as on Soviet-designed main battle tanks used by both Ukraine’s Defense Forces and the russian army.

While they present well-reasoned objections about the potential drawbacks of these protective measures, they fail to offer a viable alternative. This conclusion is evident from a recent publication by the German defense portal Hartpunkt.

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Leopard 2A4 without camouflage kikimora
Leopard 2A4 without the camouflage "kikimora" / Photo credit: Ruslan Tarasov/ArmyInform

A significant portion of this publication is dedicated to detailing various examples of improvised tank protection seen on both Ukrainian and russian vehicles. We will omit this section, as it can be read in the original article via the provided link.

Instead, we will focus on the conclusions, where the authors outline their concerns and assessments regarding the effectiveness of such improvised protection methods.

First, they argue that these modifications disrupt the "iron triangle" of tank design—mobility, protection, and firepower—which collectively define a tank's battlefield performance. For example, adding more grilles and cages increases weight, reducing mobility—not to mention the negative impact on the crew’s situational awareness.

Photo credit: the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

For russian "turtle tanks," a major issue is how the crew can effectively monitor the battlefield. Additionally, target engagement efficiency suffers, as the turret’s rotation speed and firing angles are significantly reduced.

The integration of electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter attack drones is relevant, but these systems may also interfere with a tank’s own communication equipment. Moreover, if extra armor significantly increases the vehicle’s weight, it accelerates chassis wear and tear. Another concern is that grilles and cages may obstruct the deployment of onboard smoke screens.

russian "barn tank"
russian "barn tank" / Illustrative photo from open sources

The publication concludes that while these improvised protection measures provide short-term benefits in close-range engagements, they are unlikely to remain effective in the long run. Therefore, the authors suggest that active protection systems—such as Trophy—offer a more viable solution, especially as improvements are being made to enhance their effectiveness against attack drones.

However, as Defense Express emphasizes, these conclusions only highlight the broader conceptual deadlock in tank protection against modern battlefield threats.

Israeli Merkava MkIII tanks with grills and rubber pads against magnetic mines
Israeli Merkava MkIII tanks with grills and rubber pads against magnetic mines, January 2024, / Photo credit: Gil Cohen Magen/Xinhua
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