After a russian Kh-101 cruise missile flew nearly 100 km into Polish airspace during another large-scale attack on Ukraine and exploded near the village of Tarnawa-Kolonia in the Lublin Voivodeship, a heated debate erupted in Poland. The discussion centers on how the missile was able to penetrate so deeply, whether Polish air defenses could have intercepted it, and how the country should respond to similar incidents in the future.
One of the most outspoken voices has been Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jarosław Gromadziński, now chairman of the Defence Institute think tank. Speaking to Defence24, he criticized the way Poland is currently developing its air-defense architecture, arguing that Warsaw has failed to draw the proper lessons from previous incidents. Since 2022, russian cruise missiles have violated Polish airspace on several occasions.
Read more: Why Did Poland Fail Again to Intercept russian Cruise Missile That Flew 100 km Into Its Airspace?
"If we base our response solely on observations made from our own border, and that is essentially what we are doing today, we are already behind the curve. Cruise missiles such as the Kh-101 travel extremely fast. Once they cross the border, our ability to react effectively is already limited."
Gromadziński also argued that Poland must focus on systemic solutions rather than ad hoc responses, beginning with a clear definition of what is required for a truly layered air-defense network.
"We need to define its components and the engagement ranges available to us. Only on that foundation can we build real security. Unfortunately, I currently see a serious lack of consistency in this effort," he concluded.
From Defense Express, it is worth noting that effective air defense depends not only on having sufficient interceptors and launchers. It also requires a properly integrated system covering the entire engagement chain, from detecting enemy launches, tracking incoming threats and their maneuvers, to finally intercepting them.
That is precisely why real combat experience is so valuable. Ukraine has accumulated unmatched practical expertise in countering large-scale missile attacks, and that experience can be transferred to partner nations relatively quickly. One example was during the Iran conflict, when U.S. forces rapidly deployed Ukraine's Sky Map command-and-control system at their regional bases.
Regarding more demanding targets such as cruise missiles, which fly significantly faster than conventional or jet-powered Shahed/Geran drones, Gromadziński proposed a strategic solution: reaching an agreement with Ukraine that would allow the Polish military to receive advance tracking data on airborne threats while they are still 100-200 km from the Polish border.
Such an arrangement would give Poland's air-defense forces valuable additional time to assess the threat, prepare interceptors, and coordinate their response instead of, as he put it, "putting out the fire after it has already started."
The retired general also pointed to another serious structural weakness: Poland's civilian warning system. During the missile's flight, air-raid sirens reportedly activated in areas that faced no danger while failing to sound in locations that were actually at risk.
Overall, Poland still possesses one major advantage that Ukraine did not have before russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Warsaw still has time to prepare its integrated air-defense system for a potential large-scale conflict with russia, using the hard-earned combat experience of Ukraine's Defense Forces as a guide.
Read more: Poland Held Same Weapons Kit as Ukraine to Intercept russian Kh-101, Two F-16s, Two MiG-29s, Saab 340 AEW, Yet Missile Flew 100km Deep and Exploded
